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Abstract
The paper addresses the following question: how ecient is the market system in allocating
resources if trade takes place at some prices p that are not necessarily competitive? Even
though there are many partial answers to this question, an answer that stands comparison
to the rigor by which the rst and second welfare theorems are derived is lacking. We
rst prove a "Folk Theorem" on the generic suboptimality of equilibria at non-competitive
prices. The more interesting problem is whether equilibria are constrained optimal, i.e.
ecient relative to all allocations that are consistent with prices at which trade takes place.
We give a necessary condition, called the separating property, for constrained optimality:
each constrained household should be constrained on each constrained market. If the
number of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary condition is also
sucient. In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. In all other cases, this necessary
condition is typically not sucient and equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal.
Key words: Non-competitive prices, welfare, Pareto improvement.
JEL classication numbers: D45, D51, D61.
1 Introduction
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith described how the pursuit of self-interest can
promote the interest of society. Since then, economists have devoted much of their time in
providing rigorous foundations to this claim, which nally resulted in the rst and second
fundamental welfare theorems. These theorems are valid only in idealized circumstances,
among which the requirement that all trade takes place at competitive prices, including
trade in contracts contingent on all imaginable future events.
The case where the assumption of complete nancial markets is relaxed has received
much attention in the recent literature. When markets are incomplete, then a compet-
itive equilibrium is typically suboptimal. The appropriate question to ask, however, is
not whether competitive equilibria are optimal, but whether competitive allocations are
optimal relative to the restrictions imposed by market incompleteness. When a fully in-
formed central planner, who takes into account the implications of market incompleteness,
is able to improve upon a competitive allocation, then competitive equilibria are said to
be constrained suboptimal. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that competitive
equilibria are typically constrained suboptimal, by showing that Pareto improvements can
be obtained by making the appropriate redistributions in households' initial asset portfo-
lios and next restricting all trade in asset markets. More recently, similar results have been
obtained that show the possibility of generating Pareto improvements by introducing new
nancial assets, see Cass and Citanna (1998), or Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) for a
more general perspective, and the possibility of generating Pareto improvements by price
regulation, see Dreze and Gollier (1993) and Herings and Polemarchakis (1999).
The assumption that all trade takes place at competitive prices has also been relaxed.
During the last quarter of the 20th century, traditionalWalrasian theory has accommodated
in a general equilibrium setting the possibility of sluggish price adjustment, short-run
price rigidities, and, as a consequence, non-clearing markets. For seminal contributions,
see Benassy (1975), Dreze (1975) and Younes (1975). Attention has been focused on
issues of equilibrium existence, and on explanations why prices and wages may not adjust
freely to equate supply and demand. Instances of the latter are cases with information
imperfectness, menu costs, renegotiation costs and so on. Many empirical studies show that
quantity constraints, like involuntary unemployment in the labor market, and infrequent
price adjustments, like nominal wage rigidities, are common in the real world, see Romer
(1996). Other examples where the analysis of non-clearing markets is relevant are situations
involving market power, planned economies and markets for agricultural products, see
Benassy (1993). More generally, application of standard tools from public choice theory
shows that governments have incentives to intervene in the price formation process to gain
votes, see Herings (1997) and Tuinstra (1998).
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Most economists share the strong conviction that imperfections in the price formation
process, and in particular trade at non-competitive prices, has strongly negative welfare
consequences. Given the strength of this conviction, it is surprising that most of its foun-
dations come from partial settings. No rigorous general results that stand comparison to
the rst and second welfare theorems, or the constrained suboptimality results in the case
of market incompleteness, are available. It is therefore that we label the claim on the
detrimental eects of trade at non-competitive prices as a Folk Theorem.
The paper addresses the following question: how ecient is the market system in
allocating resources when prices are not competitive. To get an answer, we analyse the
equilibria of the cleanest xed price model available, the one of Dreze (1975). In his seminal
paper, Dreze introduced the concept of quantity rationing in a general equilibrium model
with price rigidities. In this approach a household chooses that commodity bundle which is
most preferred by it, subject to both the budget constraint and the quantity constraints on
net trades. The quantity rationing may aect either supply or demand of a commodity, but
it never aects both simultaneously to reect the transparency of markets. The rst main
result we show is the Folk Theorem on the generically suboptimal allocation of resources
when prices are non-competitive.
Inspired by the incomplete markets literature, we continue our investigation by analyz-
ing a concept of constrained optimality, that takes into account the restrictions imposed by
trading at false prices. Suppose that trade takes place at prices p and that an allocation is
ecient relative to the set of physically feasible allocations for which the net trades of all
households have value zero at the price vector p: Such an allocation is said to be p-optimal.
Bohm and Muller (1977) give an example of an economy, whose equilibria are not p-
optimal. Maskin and Tirole (1984) observe that if all traders have strictly positive weights
in a welfare program, then non-competitive p-optimal allocations involving trade in all
markets are never voluntary, that is imply forced trade, and, therefore, are not equilibria.
However, satiation or non-constrained maximization is typical for a xed price model, see
Aumann and Dreze (1986), which implies that p-optimal allocations need not be solutions
to welfare programs with strictly positive weights. The question rises whether trade at
non-competitive prices leads typically to constrained suboptimal allocations.
A household is said to be constrained if it is subject to quantity rationing in at least one
market. A market is said to be constrained if at least one household faces constraints in that
market. We give an easy to verify necessary condition for equilibria to be p-optimal: each
constrained household should be constrained on each constrained market. If the number
of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary condition is also sucient.
In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. This case is not entirely without interest
as it is the general equilibrium equivalent of the partial equilibrium textbook picture that
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analyzes the eects of a minimum or a maximum price on a single good. In cases with
more than two goods, this necessary condition is not sucient and generic constrained
suboptimality of equilibria is obtained.
The paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 exposes a model of an exchange
economy where trade takes place at non-competitive prices. Section 3 shows that in such
an economy, equilibria are typically suboptimal. Section 4 shows that in the two com-
modity case constrained optimality holds. Section 5 derives the necessary condition that
all constrained households be constrained on each constrained market for constrained op-
timality to hold. It is shown that this criterion is typically not met when the number of
commodities is greater than or equal to three. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy denoted by E =< N ; L; fX
i
; u
i
; w
i
g
i2N
> : Here
N = f1; : : : ; Ng is the set of households, indexed by i, and L = f0; 1; : : : ; Lg is the set
of commodities, indexed by l: Each household is characterized by a consumption set X
i
;
a subset of IR
L+1
; a utility function u
i
dened on X
i
; and a vector of initial endowments
w
i
in X
i
: Price systems belong to the set P = fp 2 IR
L+1
j p
0
= 1; p 0g: Commodity 0
serves as a numeraire commodity.
To evaluate the welfare consequence of trade at non-competitive prices, we x a price
system p in P at which trade is supposed to take place. In general, since prices p might
be not compatible with a competitive equilibrium, traders will face quantity constraints
on supply and demand. The description of the market mechanism is now extended in
the sense that the information transmitted by it is no longer only the price system, but
also the maximal amount a household is able to supply of every commodity, called the ra-
tioning scheme on supply, and the maximal amount a household is able to demand of every
commodity, called the rationing scheme on demand. In this we follow the approach and
formulation of Dreze (1975). All exchange takes place against the numeraire commodity,
which is not rationed. A household faces rationing z
l
2 IR
 
and z
l
2 IR
+
in the market for
each commodity l 6= 0; which represents the minimal and the maximal amount of good l
household i is able to trade. For the sake of simplicity we only consider uniform rationing,
which means that z
l
and z
l
are the same for every household i:
Given a price system p and a rationing scheme (z; z) 2 IR
L
 
IR
L
+
; a household maximizes
its utility function u
i
over its constrained budget set dened by
B
i
(z; z; p) = fx
i
2 X
i
j px
i
 pw
i
and z
l
 x
i
l
  w
i
l
 z
l
; l = 1; : : : ; Lg:
Throughout the paper we will use the following assumptions with respect to the economy
E :
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A1 For every household i 2 N ; X
i
= IR
L+1
++
:
A2 For every household i 2 N ; the utility function u
i
is C
2
on X
i
; u
i
is dierentiably
strictly increasing, i.e., Du
i
(x
i
)  0 for all x
i
2 X
i
; and u
i
is dierentiably strictly
quasiconcave, i.e., the Gaussian curvature of I
x
i
= fy
i
2 X
i
j u
i
(y
i
) = u
i
(x
i
)g is
dierent from zero for any x
i
2 X
i
: Moreover, u
i
satises the boundary condition,
that is, for every x
i
2 X
i
the set fy
i
2 X
i
j u
i
(y
i
)  u
i
(x
i
)g is closed relative to
IR
L+1
:
A3 For every household i 2 N ; w
i
2 IR
L+1
++
:
The demand function of individual i is dened by
d
i
(z; z; p) = argmax
x
i
2B
i
(z;z;p)
u
i
(x
i
):
Assumptions A1{A3 guarantee that d
i
is a function indeed. Given (z; z; p) 2 IR
L
 
 IR
L
+
P;
household i is said to be constrained on its supply in market l if for any ~z 2 IR
L
 
; such
that ~z
k
= z
k
for k 6= l and ~z
l
= z
l
  " for some positive "; u
i
(d
i
(~z; z; p)) > u
i
(d
i
(z; z; p)): If
household i is constrained on its supply in the market for commodity l; then it follows from
the strict quasiconcavity of the utility function that d
i
l
(z; z; p) w
i
l
= z
l
: A household that
is constrained on its supply in market l can improve its utility if the rationing on supply
in market l is relaxed. A similar denition is made with respect to rationing on demand.
The market for commodity l is said to be constrained if there is at least one household
constrained on it, either on supply or on demand.
Following Dreze (1975), we introduce a Dreze equilibrium of the economy E at prices
p 2 P:
Denition 2.1 A Dreze equilibrium at prices p 2 P of an economy E is an allocation
(x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) 2
Q
i2N
X
i
such that there exists (z; z) 2 IR
L
 
 IR
L
+
satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) for all i 2 N ; x
i
maximizes u
i
on B
i
(z; z; p);
(ii)
P
i2N
x
i
=
P
i2N
w
i
;
(iii) for every l 2 Lnf0g;
x
i
0
l
  w
i
0
l
= z
l
for some i
0
2 N implies x
i
l
  w
i
l
> z
l
for all i 2 N ;
x
i
0
l
  w
i
0
l
= z
l
for some i
0
2 N implies x
i
l
  w
i
l
< z
l
for all i 2 N :
The rst two conditions of the denition are standard, they state that every household
behaves optimally given the price system and the rationing scheme, and that all markets
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clear. Condition (iii) guarantees that markets are transparent. Constraints are on one side
of the market at most. The requirement that (z; z) belong to IR
L
 
 IR
L
+
implies that there
is no forced trading. Nothing precludes that the prices p are competitive. A competitive
equilibrium is indeed a special case of a Dreze equilibrium, it is a Dreze equilibrium without
binding rationing.
Notice that the case with two commodities, L = 1; is the exact general equilibrium
analogue of the standard textbook analysis of partial equilibrium, where, for instance, a
minimum price is imposed in the market for commodity 1; which is exchanged against
commodity 0: If at the minimum price supply exceeds demand, which is the case with the
standard upward sloping supply curves and downward sloping demand curves, then the
quantity actually traded is determined by the short side of the market, the total demand
for commodity 1: Some of the suppliers will be constrained. They are only able supply
part of their preferred supply.
Now consider the general equilibrium set-up with L = 1 and suppose that at prices p
total net supply exceeds total net demand. A Dreze equilibrium will necessarily involve
only rationing on the supply side, so z
1
equals a number suciently large not to aect
the households' decision problems. Total net demand is not aected by rationing on the
supply side, so when z
1
is such that constrained net supply equals total net demand for
commodity 1, the unique Dreze equilibrium is obtained.
3 Suboptimality of equilibrium
Our rst aim is to prove the Folk Theorem that, given a tuple of utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
;
and prices p 2 P; for almost all initial endowments (w
1
; : : : ; w
N
) 2 IR
N(L+1)
++
every Dreze
equilibrium is suboptimal. An allocation (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) is said to be feasible if x
i
2 X
i
;
i 2 N ; and
P
i2N
x
i
=
P
i2N
w
i
:
Denition 3.1
A feasible allocation (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) is optimal if there is no feasible allocation y such that
u
i
(y
i
)  u
i
(x
i
) for all i 2 N with at least one inequality strict.
As a consequence of the boundary condition on the utility function, an allocation (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
)
is optimal if and only if
@
x
i
u
i
(x
i
)
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)
=
@
x
i
0
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
@
x
i
0
0
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
for every i; i
0
2 N :
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Lemma 3.2
Suppose that (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) is a Dreze equilibrium at prices p 2 P of an economy E for a
rationing scheme (z; z) 2 IR
L
 
 IR
L
+
: Then there exist 
i
2 IR
++
; 
i
l
; 
i
l
2 IR
+
; i 2 N ;
l 2 Lnf0g; such that
@
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)
= p
l
 

i
l
  
i
l

i
; i 2 N ; l 2 Lnf0g;

i
= @
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
); 
i
l
> 0 implies x
i
l
  w
i
l
= z
l
, and 
i
l
> 0 implies x
i
l
  w
i
l
= z
l
:
Proof. The conclusion of the lemma follows from the rst-order conditions for the max-
imization problem of household i:
max
x
i
2X
i
u
i
(x
i
)
s.t. px
i
  pw
i
 0;
z
l
 x
i
l
  w
i
l
 z
l
; l 2 Lnf0g:
The Lagrangian of the problem is
L
i
(x
i
; 
i
; 
i
; 
i
) = u
i
(x
i
)  
i
(px
i
  pw
i
) 
L
X
l=1


i
l
(z
l
  x
i
l
+ w
i
l
) + 
i
l
( z
l
+ x
i
l
  w
i
l
)

:
The derivatives of L
i
with respect to x
i
are equal to zero at x
i
:
@
x
i
0
L
i
= @
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)  
i
= 0;
@
x
i
l
L
i
= @
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)  
i
p
l
+ 
i
l
  
i
l
= 0; l 6= 0:
Notice that 
i
is never equal to 0; since the numeraire commodity is always desirable. The
rst part of Lemma 3.2 is now straightforward. Moreover, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
imply that

i
l
(z
i
l
  x
i
l
+ w
i
l
) = 0;

i
l
(z
i
l
  x
i
l
+ w
i
l
) = 0;
which gives the second part of the lemma.
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The interpretation of the lemma is very natural. The marginal rate of substitution be-
tween good l and the numeraire equals the price of good l; if the household is unconstrained
in market l: It is less than p
l
; if the household is constrained on its supply in market l; and
it is greater than p
l
; if the household is constrained on its demand in market l:
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Dreze equilibria may be optimal, for instance, if the initial allocation of resources is
optimal. This is necessarily the case if there is just one commodity or just one household.
But when the number of commodities and households is greater than one, we show this
situation to be rather exceptional.
When L  2 and N  2; we can construct an example of an economy with an optimal
Dreze equilibrium at non-competitive prices p but an inecient initial distribution of re-
sources. Suppose that there are two households and three commodities, and competitive
equilibrium prices p

are such that the excess demand for commodity 2 is zero for both
households, so only two goods are traded in non-zero amounts. Consider prices p such
that p
2
< p

2
; and p
l
= p

l
, l = 0; 1: It is possible to choose utility functions such that
the demand for good 2 becomes positive for both households under the price system p:
In fact, this is the natural case. Choose a rationing scheme (z; z) with z
2
= 0 and other
components of (z; z) non-binding. Strict quasi-concavity of preferences implies that z
2
= 0
is binding in an optimal solution to the household's decision problem. But then the com-
petitive allocation is a Dreze equilibrium of the economy E at prices p; which means that
the Dreze equilibrium is optimal.
For L = 1 such an example cannot be constructed. If L = 1 and the initial distribution
of resources is inecient, then a Dreze equilibrium at non-competitive prices p is necessarily
inecient. Suppose L = 1 and let x be an optimal Dreze equilibrium at non-competitive
prices p of an economy E ; whereas the initial resources of E are distributed ineciently.
There is at least one household i who is rationed, and at least one household i
0
, who is not.
The former holds because p is non-competitive. The latter because trade is needed to go
from an inecient initial distribution of resources to an optimal allocation. Condition (iii)
of Denition 2.1 implies that one side of the market of commodity 1 is unconstrained. By
Lemma 3.2 it holds that
@
x
i
u
i
(x
i
)
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)
6=
@
x
i
0
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
@
x
i
0
0
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
;
which contradicts the optimality of x:
The following proposition gives a useful characterization of optimal Dreze equilibria.
It claims that each optimal Dreze equilibrium coincides with a competitive equilibrium
allocation.
Proposition 3.3
A Dreze equilibrium x at prices p of an economy E for a rationing scheme (z; z) is optimal
if and only if x corresponds to a competitive equilibrium allocation.
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Proof. Let x be an optimal Dreze equilibrium at prices p and a rationing scheme (z; z):
Optimality together with Assumption A1 implies that
@
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)
=
@
x
i
0
l
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
@
x
i
0
0
u
i
0
(x
i
0
)
; for any i; i
0
2 N :
Then it follows from Lemma 3.2 that (
i
l
  
i
l
)=
i
does not depend on i: Together with
Condition (iii) in the denition of a Dreze equilibrium, it implies that for each market
l 2 Lnf0g; either every 
i
l
is positive, or every 
i
l
is positive, or both these multipliers are
equal to zero. The rst two cases mean that everyone in market l is constrained, so from
market clearing it follows that x
i
l
= w
i
l
; for all i 2 N : The last possibility is equivalent to
the situation of a free market without rationing. Consider a vector of prices p
0
2 P such
that
p
0
0
= p
0
= 1;
p
0
l
= p
l
 

i
l
  
i
l

i
; l 6= 0:
Since prices p
0
are dierent from p only for markets without trade, x satises the budget
condition under the price system p
0
; p
0
x
i
= p
0
w
i
; i 2 N : It follows immediately that x is a
competitive equilibrium allocation at competitive prices p
0
; which proves the \only if" part
of the proposition.
It is immediate that a Dreze equilibrium x; which corresponds to a competitive equi-
librium allocation, is optimal.
2
The next step is to show the generic suboptimality of Dreze equilibria.
Theorem 3.4
Fix any price system p 2 P and utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
satisfying Assumption A2.
Then there is an open set of full Lebesgue measure of initial endowments in IR
N(L+1)
++
such
that every Dreze equilibrium at prices p of the economy E is suboptimal.
Proof. By Proposition 3.3, an optimal Dreze equilibrium corresponds to a competitive
equilibrium allocation. It follows from the results in Laroque (1978) that for an open set of
full Lebesgue measure of initial endowments, for every competitive equilibrium allocation
x

;
x
i
l
  w
i
l
6= 0;
for every household i and every commodity l: Therefore, using Lemma 3.2, generically in
initial endowments, cases where all 
i
l
> 0 and all 
i
l
> 0 are excluded. Generically in
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endowments, an optimal Dreze equilibrium consists of competitive equilibrium prices and
a competitive equilibrium allocation.
To complete the proof we need to show that for generic w the price system p is
not competitive. Let z(p; w) denote aggregate excess demand at prices p and endow-
ments w = (w
1
; : : : ; w
N
): Let F
l
(p; w) be equal to z
l
(p; w) for l = 1; : : : ; L; and dene
F
L+1
(p; w) = p
L
 p
L
: If (p; w) is such that z(p; w) = 0; then the rank of the matrix @
w
z(p; w)
is L; see Mas-Colell (1985), p. 227. Therefore, the rank of the system @
w;p
L
F (p; w);
@
w
z(p; w) @
p
L
z(p; w)
0 1
is equal to L + 1 if F (p; w) = 0: By the Transversality Theorem, @
~p
F
w
(p) has full rank
for almost all w 2 IR
N(L+1)
++
if F
w
(p) = 0; where F
w
(p) = F (p; w); ~p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
L
): Since
the rank of @
~p
F
w
(p) can at most be L; generically in initial endowments, z(p; w) = 0 and
p
L
= p
L
has no solution. Consequently, generically in initial endowments, the price system
p is not competitive. We conclude that for a set of endowments of full Lebesgue measure,
all Dreze equilibria are suboptimal.
We now show that we can choose the set of initial endowments of full Lebesgue mea-
sure for which all Dreze equilibria are suboptimal to be open. Notice that the set of
(p; w) 2 P  IR
N(L+1)
++
such that F (p; w) = 0 is closed due to the continuity of F: It follows
from Balasko (1988), page 89, that the natural projection function, which maps (p; w) into
w; is proper. This implies that the set of initial endowments, for which some compet-
itive equilibrium price has its last component equal to p
L
; is closed, since the image of
a closed set under a proper function is closed. The complement of this set is open and
of full Lebesgue measure. The intersection of this set with the open set of full Lebesgue
measure for which there is trade for every household for every commodity at a competitive
equilibrium, is open and of full measure and contains only endowments with suboptimal
Dreze equilibria.
2
The theorem gives a rigorous statement of the Folk Theorem on the generic subop-
timality of equilibria at non-competitive prices. The next step is whether we can even
strengthen this conclusion to generic constrained suboptimality.
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4 Constrained optimality when L = 1
It is apparent that as long as prices are not competitive, full optimality is too much to
be expected. The appropriate criterion in this case is the one of constrained optimality or
p-optimality, that is optimality relative to all allocations for which trades of all households
have zero value at an admissible price system p. The notion of p-optimality was introduced
for the rst time in Younes (1975).
Denition 4.1
Fix a price system p 2 P: A feasible allocation (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) 2
Q
i2N
X
i
is p-optimal if there
is no allocation (y
1
; : : : ; y
N
) 2
Q
i2N
X
i
such that
(i) 8i 2 N py
i
= pw
i
;
(ii)
P
i2N
y
i
=
P
i2N
w
i
;
(iii) 8i 2 N u
i
(y
i
)  u
i
(x
i
) with strict inequality for at least one i
0
2 N :
We start by analyzing the case with two commodities, so L = 1: Strict quasi-concavity
of utility functions implies that the preferences of households over the set of all attainable
amounts of good 1 given xed prices and the budget constraint are single-peaked. In this
case it is possible to show uniqueness and constrained optimality of a Dreze equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2
If L = 1; then a Dreze equilibrium (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) at prices p 2 P of an economy E is unique
and p-optimal.
Proof. If L = 1; then quantity constraints are present only on the market of commodity
1: As far as an analysis of equilibrium is concerned, there is no loss of generality by indexing
all relevant rationing schemes as a function of q; q 2 [0; 1] :
z
1
(q) =  q(
X
i2N
w
i
1
+ ");
z
1
(q) = q(
X
i2N
w
i
1
+ ");
where " is an arbitrarily chosen positive real number. The aggregate excess demand for
commodity 1 at prices p and rationing parameters q; q is given by
z
1
(q; q) =
X
i2N
d
i
1
(z
1
(q); z
1
(q); p) 
X
i2N
w
i
1
:
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Since households face constraints either on demand, or on supply, but not on both of them,
it is possible to represent all relevant rationing schemes by a single parameter q 2 [0; 1] as
follows:
~z
1
(q) = z
1
(minf2q; 1g;minf2  2q; 1g):
Here q = 0 corresponds to the full rationing on supply, q = 1 corresponds to the full
rationing on demand, and when q = 1=2 there is no rationing at all. It is immediate that
~z
1
(0)  0 and ~z
1
(1)  0: The function ~z
1
is continuous and is easily shown to be weakly
decreasing in q:
Proposition 4.2 is clearly true if p is competitive. If p is non-competitive, assume
that ~z
1
(1=2) < 0: Let q
s
be the minimal value of q such that ~z
1
(q
s
) =
e
z
1
(1=2): Since the
rationing scheme z
1
(2q) is binding for at least one household for all q 2 [0; q
s
); it is easy
to see that the function ~z
1
is strictly decreasing on the interval [0; q
s
]: Moreover, ~z
1
(0)  0
and ~z
1
(q
s
) = ~z
1
(1=2) < 0: This implies that a Dreze equilibrium exists and is unique.
Households on the short side of the market, the demand side in this case, are not rationed
and get the most preferred consumption bundle they can reach under the given xed prices,
households on the long side cannot improve without making some other household worse
o. Therefore, a Dreze equilibrium is p-optimal.
A similar argument applies when
e
z
1
(1=2) > 0:
2
Without any doubt the case L = 1 is special. We think it has some importance, as
it is the case that is typically analyzed in textbooks. In Section 3 we have argued that
optimality of equilibrium typically fails when L = 1: More precisely, we have argued above
Proposition 3.3 that an equilibrium at non-competitive prices p is ecient for L = 1 if and
only if the initial distribution of resources is ecient. Proposition 4.2 makes clear that a
weaker notion of optimality, p-optimality holds for all equilibria.
5 Constrained suboptimality when L  2
If L is greater than or equal to 2; the situation becomes dierent. Then a Dreze equi-
librium is not necessarily p-optimal. Two counter-examples can be found in Bohm and
Muller (1977). Using a modied Edgeworth box diagram, they showed that equilibria
and constrained optima constitute two disjoint sets. At the same time, robust exam-
ples of constrained optimal Dreze equilibria can be easily found as well. Figure 1 shows
such an example. There are three goods in an economy and two households endowed
with the same amount of initial resources. The big triangle CDE corresponds to the set
11
fx
i
2 X
i
j px
i
= pw
i
g; where the price system p is xed. The second household consumes
its most preferred consumption bundle on CDE: The triangle x
1
AB corresponds to the
constrained budget set of the rst household. This household faces lower bounds on the
net trade in the market for both commodities 1 and 2. An indierence curve through x
1
is
depicted. It is easily veried that (x
1
; x
2
) is a p-optimal Dreze equilibrium. Our next aim
is to provide mild conditions that rule out examples like this one.
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Figure 1: Example of a p-optimal equilibrium.
Let p 2 P be a xed price system. To study the matter of constrained optimality,
consider a \transformed" economy
~
E with the same set of traders N as in the original
economy E ; and the set of goods
~
L = Lnf0g: The economy
~
E is derived from E by using
the budget equality to eliminate commodity 0: Initial endowments, consumption sets and
utility functions of household i 2 N are specied as follows:
~w
i
= w
i
 0
;
~
X
i
= f(~x
i
1
; : : : ; ~x
i
L
) 2 IR
L
++
j ~p(~x
i
  ~w
i
)  w
i
0
g;
~u
i
(~x
i
) = u
i
(w
i
0
  ~p(~x
i
  ~w
i
); ~x
i
1
; : : : ; ~x
i
L
);
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where ~p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
L
): The rst order conditions for an optimum of the economy
~
E give
the following characterization of a p-optimal allocation for E : It holds that (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) 2
Q
i2N
X
i
is a p-optimum if and only if there exist some q 2 IR
L
nf0g and  2 IR
N
+
such that
(@
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)  p
l
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
))
l=1;:::;L
= 
i
q:
As we have seen before, at any Dreze equilibrium allocation x;
@
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)  p
l
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
) =  
i
l
+ 
i
l
;
for some non-negative real 
i
l
; 
i
l
such that 
i
l

i
l
= 0: Let N
C
 N be the set of all
constrained households, given a Dreze equilibrium (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
): Then 
i
= 0 implies that
household i consumes its most preferred element of the set fx
i
2 X
i
j px
i
= pw
i
g: For each
i 2 N
C
, 
i
6= 0: Therefore, if a Dreze equilibrium is p-optimal, then
q
l
= 0 ) 
i
l
= 
i
l
= 0; 8i 2 N
C
;
q
l
> 0 ) 
i
l
> 0; 8i 2 N
C
;
q
l
< 0 ) 
i
l
> 0; 8i 2 N
C
:
The above allows us to formulate a necessary condition for a Dreze equilibrium to be
p-optimal. We call this condition the separating property.
Proposition 5.1 (Separating property)
If a Dreze equilibrium is p-optimal, then every constrained household is constrained in every
constrained market.
The separating property is quite powerful since it is stated in observable data only. When-
ever there are two households that face constraints, but in dierent markets, constrained
suboptimality is the case. The separating property is a very strong requirement, so very
stringent conditions are needed to achieve constrained optimality. Notice that in the ex-
ample in Figure 1, the separating property is satised.
The separating property is trivially satised if L = 1; or if there is only one constrained
household. The rst case has been analyzed in Section 4, where it has been concluded that
constrained optimality results in the case with two commodities.
The vector q is also called a vector of coupons prices in the literature, see Dreze and
Muller (1980). Note the one to one correspondence between the side of rationing and the
sign of a component of a coupons price vector for p-optimal Dreze equilibria.
We already argued that the separating condition is strong, and if satised, only a
necessary condition. The next result gives conditions for the separating condition to be
sucient for p-optimality.
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Theorem 5.2
Any Dreze equilibrium at prices p of an economy E with the number of constrained house-
holds or the number of constrained markets less than or equal to one, is p-optimal.
Proof. In the case where the number of constrained households or the number of
constrained markets equals zero, the Dreze equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equi-
librium allocation, so optimality and therefore p-optimality follows.
Suppose the number of constrained households equals one. Then dene 
i
= 1 and
q
l
=  
i
l
+ 
i
l
; l = 1; : : : ; L; with 
i
l
; 
i
l
; the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the
rationing constraints of the constrained household i: It follows that the condition for p-
optimality is satised.
Suppose the number of constrained markets equals one, say market l is constrained.
Then dene 
i
=  
i
l
+ 
i
l
; i 2 N ; and dene q to be the l-th unit vector in IR
L
: Again, it
follows that the condition for p-optimality is satised.
2
Our nal claim is that under weak conditions, the separating property is typically not
a sucient condition for constrained optimality. More precisely, Dreze equilibria for which
the set of constrained households N
C
and the set of constrained markets L
C
consist of
more than one element each, are generically not p-optimal.
Theorem 5.3
Fix any price system p 2 P and utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
satisfying Assumption A2.
There is an open set of full Lebesgue measure of initial endowments in IR
N(L+1)
++
such that
every Dreze equilibrium at prices p of the economy E with the number of constrained house-
holds and the number of constrained markets greater than or equal to two, is not p-optimal.
Proof. It is helpful to introduce a vector r that describes the state of the markets. The
vector r is an element of
R = fr 2 IR
L
jr
l
=  1; 0; or 1g;
where r
l
=  1 if there is supply rationing in market l; r
l
= 0 if there is no rationing in
market l; and r
l
= 1 if there is demand rationing in market l: We also introduce a vector
s that describes whether a household is rationed or not. The vector s is an element of
S = fs 2 IR
N
js
i
= 0 or 1g;
where s
i
= 1 if and only if i belongs to the set of constrained households N
C
.
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Denote by c
i
l
(x
i
) the derivative with respect to x
i
l
of the \transformed" utility function
~u
i
we used before:
c
i
l
(x
i
) = @
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)  p
l
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
):
We know from Lemma 3.2 that for any Dreze equilibrium (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) 2
Q
i2N
X
i
;
c
i
l
(x
i
) =  
i
l
+ 
i
l
;
for some non-negative 
i
l
; 
i
l
| the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing
constraints. If a Dreze equilibrium x is p-optimal, then for any l; l
0
2 L; i; i
0
2 N ;






c
i
l
(x
i
) c
i
l
(x
i
0
)
c
i
l
0
(x
i
) c
i
l
0
(x
i
0
)






=






 
i
l
+ 
i
l
 
i
0
l
+ 
i
0
l
 
i
l
0
+ 
i
l
0
 
i
0
l
0
+ 
i
0
l
0






=







i
q
l

i
0
q
l

i
q
l
0

i
0
q
l
0






= 0:
For given r 2 R and s 2 S; consider the sets
M
rs
= f(
i
)
i2N
C 2 IR
jN
C
jjL
C
j
j 
i
l
< 0 if r
l
=  1; 
i
l
> 0 if r
l
= 1g;
Z
r
= fz 2 IR
jL
C
j
j z
l
< " if r
l
=  1; z
l
>  " if r
l
= 1g;
where " is some given positive number.
By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, if (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) is a Dreze equilibrium that satises the
separating property, then there exists r 2 R, s 2 S,  2 IR
N
++
,  2 M
rs
, and z 2 Z
r
such
that
1
px
i
  pw
i
= 0; i 2 N ; (1)
@
x
i
0
u
i
(x
i
)  
i
= 0; i 2 N ; (2)
@
x
i
l
u
i
(x
i
)  
i
p
l
  
i
l
= 0; i 2 N ; l 2 Lnf0g; (3)
X
i2N
(x
i
l
  w
i
l
) = 0; l 2 Lnf0g; (4)
x
i
l
  w
i
l
  z
l
= 0; i 2 N
C
; l 2 L
C
: (5)
The number of unknowns in this system equals N(L+ 2) + jN
C
jjL
C
j+ jL
C
j; which is less
than the number of equations N(L+2)+ jN
C
jjL
C
j+L; or is equal to it if jL
C
j = L: Since
there is a nite number of constrained markets and households, there is a nite number of
such systems. Since a nite intersection of open sets of full Lebesgue measure is open and
of full Lebesgue measure, it is enough to restrict attention to an arbitrary xed r and s.
1
Notice that a Dreze equilibrium always leads to a solution to the system of equations. The other
way around is not necessarily true, since non-binding inequality constraints have been omitted, and the
denition of Z
r
implies that a limited amount (") of forced trading is not excluded in a solution to the
system of equations.
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Suppose that (x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) is a p-optimal Dreze equilibrium. Without loss of generality,
f1; 2g  N
C
and f1; 2g  L
C
: By the separating property and the equation in determinants
derived before,

1
1

2
2
  
1
2

2
1
= 0: (6)
Thus, p-optimal Dreze equilibria satisfy a system of n equations, where
n = (N + 1)(L+ 2) + jN
C
jjL
C
j   1;
which is at least one more than there are unknowns.
Let  (w; x; z; ; ) be the function dened as the left-hand side of the equations (1)
{ (6). It is dened on
Q
i2N
X
i

Q
i2N
X
i
 Z
r
 IR
N
++
 M
rs
and takes its values in
IR
(N+1)(L+2)+jN
C
jjL
C
j 1
: The key element of the proof is the fact that  is transversal to the
origin, i.e. whenever  (w; x; z; ; ) = 0; its Jacobian is of full rank.
Suppose that there exists y 2 IR
n
such that
y
T
@ (:) = 0:
We write y = (y
1
; : : : ; y
6
); where y
1
2 IR
N
; y
2
2 IR
N
; y
3
2 IR
NL
; y
4
2 IR
L
; y
5
2 IR
jN
C
jjL
C
j
;
and y
6
2 IR: Then, in particular,
y
T
@
w
i
0
 (:) =  p
0
y
1;i
= 0;
so y
1
= 0: If l 2 LnL
C
; then taking into account the previous expression one gets
y
T
@
w
1
l
 (:) =  y
4;l
= 0:
For l 2 L
C
we have
y
T
@
w
i
l
 (:) =  y
4;l
  y
5;i;l
= 0; for i 2 N
C
y
T
@
w
i
l
 (:) =  y
4;l
= 0; for i 2 NnN
C
;
and
y
T
@
z
l
 (:) =  
X
i2N
C
y
5;i;l
= 0:
Thus,
P
i2N
C
y
5;i;l
= jN
C
jy
4;l
; so y
4;l
= 0; l 2 L
C
: Therefore, y
5;i;l
= 0; i 2 N
C
; l 2 N
C
:
Moreover,
y
T
@

1
1
 (:) = y
6

2
2
= 0;
so y
6
= 0: To complete the proof of regularity it is sucient to show that the matrix
(@
2
u
i
(x
i
); p
>
)
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has a full row rank for every i 2 N : This follows from the dierentiable strict quasiconcavity
of the utility function, Proposition 2.6.4 of Mas-Colell (1985), and the possibility to cover
a consumption set by a countable number of compacts.
By the Transversality Theorem, @
(x;z;;)
 
w
(x; z; ; ) has full rank for almost all w 2
IR
N(L+1)
++
if  
w
(x; z; ; ) = 0; where  
w
(x; z; ; ) =  (w; x; z; ; ): Therefore, generically
in w; the inverse image of f0g has the same co-dimension as zero, which implies that
 
w
(x; z; ; ) = 0 has no solution. We conclude that for a set of endowments of full
Lebesgue measure, any Dreze equilibrium is constrained suboptimal.
Denote by S the set
Q
i2N
X
i
 Z
r
 IR
N
++
M
rs
: To show that we can chose the set
of initial endowments of full Lebesgue measure for which Dreze equilibria are constrained
suboptimal to be open, consider the set  of all (w; x; z; ; ) 2 IR
N(L+1)
++
 S such that
 (w; x; z; ; ) = 0: This set is closed by continuity of  : Moreover, it is not dicult to
see that the set f(w; x; z; ; ) 2  j w 2 Kg is compact for any compact subset K of
IR
N(L+1)
++
: The latter means that the natural projection function  :  ! IR
N(L+1)
++
that
maps (w; x; z; ; ) to w is proper. Therefore, the set of all w for which the conclusion of
the theorem does not hold, is closed as the image of a closed set by a proper function. Its
complement is open and, as has been shown before, contains a set of full Lebesgue measure.
2
The condition that the number of constrained markets is greater than or equal to two
may be omitted from the statement of Theorem 5.3, since it is a generic property when
L > 1: The proof of this fact goes along the same lines as the proof of the theorem above.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4
Fix any price system p 2 P and utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
satisfying Assumption A2.
There is an open set of full Lebesgue measure of initial endowments in IR
N(L+1)
++
such that
every Dreze equilibrium at prices p of the economy E with the number of constrained house-
holds greater than or equal to two, is not p-optimal.
It is not possible to claim that the number of constrained households is generically
greater than one. For any tuple of utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
satisfying Assumption A2,
there is an open set of initial endowments 
  IR
N(L+1)
++
such that for every w 2 
 there
is a Dreze equilibrium with only one constrained household. The example is constructed
in such a way that the constrained household is constrained on its supply in all markets,
whereas all other households have small net demands for all non-numeraire commodities.
Consider any tuple of utility functions u
1
; : : : ; u
N
satisfying Assumption A2 and x
an arbitrary price system p 2 P: Let x
i
be the unconstrained demand of household i at
prices p when it has initial endowments e; where e is the vector of all ones in IR
L+1
: Pick
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initial endowments for household 1 and a rationing scheme (z; z) such that household 1,
at prices p and rationing scheme (z; z); is constrained on its supply in each market for
non-numeraire commodities and  z is smaller than x
i
for i = 2; : : : ; N: To achieve this,
one may take w
1
2 fw 2 X
1
jpw = peg such that w
1
 0
 x
1
 0
; so the unconstrained demand
of household 1 at prices p equals x
1
; and household 1 prefers to supply all non-numeraire
commodities. Take z
1
1
= x
1
1
  w
1
1
+ "
1
; with "
1
a small positive number. By continuity,
the demand ~x
1
of household 1 when taking z
1
into account is close to x
1
; in particular all
non-numeraire commodities are still supplied by household 1, and rationing in the market
for commodity 1 is binding. Take z
2
= ~x
1
2
 w
1
2
+"
2
; with "
2
a positive number that is small
enough for rationing in the market for commodity 1 to remain binding. This construction
is repeated until the rationing scheme z is obtained that induces rationing on the supply of
household 1 in the markets for all non-numeraire commodities. By taking w
1
suciently
close to x
1
; the requirement that  z be smaller than x
i
; i = 2; : : : ; N; can be fullled as
well. The rationing scheme z is chosen as never to aect the choice of any household.
For i = 2; : : : ; N; initial endowments are taken such that household i is on the short
side of each market,
w
i
= x
i
 
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
L
P
l=1
p
l
z
l
=(N   1)
 z
1
=(N   1)
.
.
.
 z
L
=(N   1)
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
Since all households, but household 1, get their most preferred commodity bundle at prices
p; it follows that (d
1
(z; z; p); x
2
; : : : ; x
N
) is a p-optimal Dreze equilibrium. If we slightly
perturb the initial endowments, total net demand of households excluding household 1
changes slightly, and a Dreze equilibrium is obtained by rationing the supply of household 1
by this amount. All other households remain unconstrained. The property of p-optimality
is obviously kept. It follows that there is an open set of initial endowments with p-optimal
Dreze equilibria.
6 Conclusions
Notwithstanding the strong conviction of most economists that trade at non-competitive
prices has detrimental welfare consequences, it is not based on foundations derived with
equal rigor as the rst and second welfare theorems. This paper provides these foundations.
We show that the Folk Theorem holds that equilibria are typically suboptimal when trade
at non-competitive prices occurs.
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The more appropriate question to answer is whether equilibria are perhaps not even
constrained optimal. In this paper we formalized the notion of constrained optimality
as optimality among allocations where budget constraints of all households at the non-
competitive prices are met. A necessary condition for constrained optimality to prevail
is the separability condition that all constrained households be constrained on all con-
strained markets. This condition is of interest in itself as it is formulated in terms that are
observable. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary
condition is always satised. We show that in this case it is also a sucient condition, so
constrained optimality holds in the two commodity case. When there are three or more
commodities, then this sucient condition does typically not hold at equilibrium. As a
consequence, even the stronger Folk Theorem, that equilibria are typically constrained
suboptimal when trade at non-competitive prices occurs, is true as well under reasonable
assumptions.
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